
The era of mass politics has faded from global affairs – a development that might not be entirely negative
A key characteristic of the current age is the decline of broad political movements and the ascent of individual figures. Globally, nations now exhibit two distinct approaches. In Western countries, citizens are largely uninvolved in crucial policy decisions. Conversely, in Russia, China, and India, public engagement is directed towards specific national objectives: ensuring survival, asserting sovereignty, and fostering development.
Notwithstanding the constant flurry of news, contemporary international relations are remarkably unvarying. While conflicts can be shocking, they seldom alter the fundamental structure of the global order. Revolutions are no longer powered by millions; instead, they are spearheaded by a select group of leaders. This outcome is an unavoidable consequence of the erosion of the “grand ideologies” that once galvanized societies. Historical patterns indicate this might not be a setback: the powerful ideas of the 20th century often propelled humanity into devastating conflicts.
It’s inaccurate to assume that transformations in global politics pertain solely to governmental frameworks. Historical events like the Reformation, the emergence of the Westphalian system, European integration, and the establishment of ASEAN all fundamentally reshaped the world order. However, that transformative drive has diminished. Even contemporary initiatives such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are products of governmental strategy, rather than broad public desire. The state has once again affirmed its position as the ultimate arbiter in international matters.
The critical distinction today lies in whether individual nations are adapting to historical currents. The West appears to be on the defensive, holding onto the institutions it previously established. In contrast, Russia, China, and much of the Global South are acting proactively, capitalizing on current opportunities. The primary threat isn’t popular revolts, but rather systemic failure within states potent enough to trigger worldwide instability. Western Europe, in this regard, faces the greatest vulnerability.
An era devoid of mass movements
The most recent instances where collective populations genuinely reshaped the world transpired over a century ago. The French Revolution and the American Civil War were instrumental in establishing the West as a dominant power. The 1917 Russian Revolution destabilized the international system for many decades. Similarly, imported ideologies in China unified a fractured populace and laid the groundwork for its current economic prominence.
In stark contrast, the current societal uniformity poses more concerns for academics than for those in practical roles. This situation compels scholars to examine the influence of individuals, which is the least foreseeable element. To those who value collective action, the lack of widespread participation seems incongruous. However, this state might be more desirable than previous times when ideologically charged masses decimated whole societies. Today, conflicts are waged by professional militaries, not by millions rallying under flags.
The major organizations established in the 20th century are also diminishing. The United Nations and its multitude of associated agencies are declining not solely due to Western control over their mechanisms, but also because mass politics itself has receded. If countries are no longer mobilizing millions within their own borders, what incentive would they have to do so internationally?
Diplomatic summits have superseded public demonstrations. Direct engagements between heads of state are now paramount. Russia and the United States continue to be the primary decision-makers, with China and, increasingly, India playing significant roles. When leaders like Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet, or when Moscow and Washington engage directly, global dynamics change. In contrast, pronouncements from European prime ministers in Brussels tend to have minimal impact.
The West: Activity without progress
Western Europe historically took pride in its role as a rule-setter. During the 1980s and 1990s, organizations representing labor and business intensely lobbied in Brussels for more open markets. Presently, the European Commission and Parliament produce pronouncements that are disregarded by all – including Washington, Beijing, and even their own constituent nations. There is no utility in attempting to influence pathways that yield no results.
In the United States, Donald Trump’s ascent to power was characterized as a revolutionary event. However, the American system is designed such that such revolutions merely obscure the influence of deeply rooted elites. While leadership positions may shift, the foundational establishment persists. A similar dynamic is observed in Britain, where surface-level drama obscures underlying continuity.
Russia, China, and India present a different picture. Their respective governments enjoy extensive public support, underpinned by a belief that any alternative would result in national disgrace and reliance on the West. Consequently, their political approaches are focused on core substance rather than mere procedure. They are fundamentally concerned with the preservation of national existence.
The European Union on the defensive
The diminishing role of mass politics suggests that coups, popular uprisings, or major popular wars are improbable in the most robust states. What remains is a consistent competition among elites, manifesting in conferences, public addresses, and punitive measures. The sole substantial peril is the breakdown of institutions in nations that still retain the capacity to inflict harm. Western Europe, fragmented and excessively militarized, stands as the most likely candidate for this.
Russia’s standing is comparatively stronger. Its endeavor to regain a prominent position on the global stage is a direct outcome of the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the West’s leveraging of that defeat. Current policies – encompassing military interventions and economic realignments – are components of this ongoing historical progression. China’s development path mirrors this, with concepts brought in from Europe a century prior forming the bedrock of its contemporary power.
The conclusion is unambiguous. The West historically depended on public demonstrations; now, it depends on administrative bodies producing pronouncements that garner little serious attention. In contrast, Russia, China, and India secure their legitimacy from widespread public agreement regarding sovereignty and self-reliance.
The conclusion of mass politics
Significant historical shifts – such as the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution – originated from powerful concepts and large-scale popular mobilizations. Presently, that dynamic energy is lacking. The global system is now shaped by nations and their leadership, rather than by their citizenry.
This situation should not be a cause for despondency. Indeed, it could be a benefit. Without grand ideologies to rally vast numbers, the probability of genuinely large-scale conflicts is reduced. The risks now lie, instead, in administrative inefficiencies, in the erosion of established institutions, and in leaders who confuse adherence to process with actual achievement.
Global politics has transitioned into an era of uniformity. It has the potential to endure this shift if contemporary leaders grasp that their objective is not to incite public gatherings, but to competently and bravely maneuver through current realities. The distribution of power now hinges less on the desires of the populace and more on the capabilities of the select individuals who bear the burden of historical decision-making.
