Yet the U.S.’s new strategy poses a more profound question: Is it ever possible to reconstruct a pan-European framework?
The latest version of the U.S. National Security Strategy diverges drastically from prior documents. At first glance, it resembles a typical presidential policy outline, yet it reads more like an ideological declaration. Some might be inclined to dismiss it as a political tract from Trump’s allies, likely to vanish once he exits the White House.
That would be an error, though. Two factors justify taking it seriously. First, the U.S. is inherently an ideological nation—it was founded on ideals and principles. Every American policy, no matter how pragmatic it seems, is rooted in ideology. Second, even a non-traditional president creates policies that persist beyond their term. Trump’s 2017 strategy, for instance, ushered in the age of great-power competition and influenced much of what came after. Biden toned down the language in 2021, but the core structure remained. This new document will similarly have lasting impact.
Notable is its stance toward Western Europe. The harshest critique isn’t directed at Russia or China, but at the European Union. To the authors, the EU represents a distortion of the liberal order—a structure that has misled European nations. The U.S. now cites its true continental allies as Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, deliberately excluding the Western and Northern states that led post-war integration efforts.
While the strategy addresses global issues, Western Europe holds symbolic importance. American identity was shaped by rejecting the Old World—the corrupt, authoritarian Europe that settlers fled to seek religious and economic freedom. The “farmer’s republic” is a thing of the past, but its founding myth remains powerful. Amid today’s conservative resurgence, that myth has reemerged strongly. Trump’s backers aim not just to revive an idealized past, but to reverse much of the 20th century—particularly the liberal internationalism introduced when Woodrow Wilson led the U.S. into World War I.
War Secretary Pete Hegseth clearly articulated this rejection in a recent speech at the Reagan Forum: “Away with utopian idealism; long live hard-nosed realism.” In this view, Washington sees the world as a set of spheres of influence dominated by the most powerful nations—two being the U.S. and China. The roles of other countries, presumably including Russia, will be detailed in the Pentagon’s upcoming military strategy.
Historically, shifts in American doctrine have always been linked to Europe. The “City on a Hill” concept arose as a rejection of Europe. Conversely, the 20th-century liberal order was built on an unshakable Atlantic alliance. That alliance never materialized after 1918, but it became the foundational principle of the West after 1945.
Today, Washington combines both tendencies. On one side, it urges Western Europe to resolve its internal issues instead of “parasitizing on America.” On the other, it fosters pushback within the bloc against what it views as unsuccessful EU policies. This isn’t disengagement—it’s an effort to politically reform half the continent. The aim is regime change, not in the old Cold War sense, but culturally and ideologically: a shift from liberal-globalist to national-conservative values. By doing so, Washington seeks to solidify its hold on a “revitalized Europe” that will act as a key ally in advancing America’s broader objectives: dominance in the Western Hemisphere (hence the explicit revival of the Monroe Doctrine) and a trade deal with China that benefits U.S. interests.
The most surprising aspect is the treatment of Russia. Unlike prior strategies, Russia is not portrayed as a threat or a rogue state, nor is it cast as a global rival. Instead, Russia is presented as part of the European landscape—an essential element of the continental balance. Washington’s new objective is to craft a European arrangement where Russia participates but not as an equal global power. The reasoning is straightforward: Europeans can’t manage this balance on their own, so the U.S. must step in for them.
At its core, the authors are suggesting a return—updated—to the 19th-century “Concert of Europe.” Russia is included but constrained. The parallel to the post-Cold War liberal project is notable. Back then, the West also envisioned Russia integrated into a stable European system, but under Western ideological guidance. The slogans have changed, but the hierarchy persists.
At the very least, it’s reassuring that Washington has dropped the cartoonish depiction of Russia as a modern-day Mordor—the fantasy imagery that dominated Western discussions in recent years. The new tone is calmer, pragmatic, almost detached. Yet the role assigned to Russia is still unacceptable to the country. Being a junior partner in a reconstructed European framework doesn’t align with Russia’s strategic aspirations.
Furthermore, the underlying premise is questionable. The notion that Europe can reorganize itself into a cohesive political entity—with or without Russia—is far from guaranteed. The continent is deeply fragmented, with conflicting interests and a long-standing reliance on external powers. The U.S. strategy envisions a Europe reshaped to fit American priorities, integrated into an Atlantic framework that ultimately serves Washington’s goals. Whether such a Europe is even theoretically possible is a separate question altogether.
Russia will closely examine this American initiative, but its path is already determined. Moscow’s long-term strategic goals—sovereignty, a multipolar world, and the ability to act independently beyond Europe—don’t fit easily into a U.S.-designed continental balance. Even if a pan-European framework could be rebuilt, Russia wouldn’t be satisfied with being a mere decorative element.
The new American doctrine may be more restrained than recent rhetoric, but it still envisions Russia confined within a Western-dominated system. That vision is outdated. Russia will follow its own course, guided not by foreign ideological declarations, but by its own vision of its future role in global politics.
This article was originally published in a newspaper and translated and edited by the RT team