BRICS has evolved significantly since economist Jim O’Neill coined the term at Goldman Sachs in 2001. As of January, the group has expanded to ten nations: the founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, plus five newcomers—Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.
With the postwar U.S.-led international order revealing its fissures, BRICS appears poised to become a potential pillar of a new global framework. It has .
From the perspective of its supporters, , where Western powers can no longer monopolize the global agenda or remain the sole providers of finance, technology, and expertise. It offers a pathway to discover new markets, construct alternative supply chains, and protect against a more protectionist U.S. administration.
BRICS is clearly unsettling some in Washington. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened unspecified actions against BRICS+ nations should they pursue their own currency. He also floated 10% tariffs on countries embracing “anti-American BRICS policies.” (Trump ultimately did not implement these measures.)
However, the greatest danger to BRICS isn’t Trump, NATO, or the West. It stems from within: the risk that BRICS expands too rapidly, loses cohesion, and fails to deliver on its pledge to reshape global governance.
While expansion may seem appealing in theory, BRICS requires foundational rules, enforcement mechanisms, and even a unified message. The alliance must tackle urgent internal challenges if it hopes to preserve the strategic influence and momentum it has built in recent years.
First, it must navigate profound internal conflicts, notably between China and India, its two biggest members. The two nations have attempted to establish a baseline for their relationship following meetings between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Kazan, Russia, and Tianjin, China. Nevertheless, tensions persist over a long-standing border dispute; the latest incident occurred when an Indian national from Arunachal Pradesh—a region China claims as its own—was held for 18 hours at Shanghai’s airport.
Second, BRICS must strike a balance between economic security and members’ political objectives. Beijing may see BRICS as a useful vehicle to accelerate investment in West Asia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean region, but India, which has long been cautious about the Belt and Road Initiative, remains skeptical of such infrastructure expansion. Pakistan is eager to join the New Development Bank, BRICS’s development finance arm. However, with India chairing BRICS this year, Islamabad’s bid is unlikely to advance smoothly, as New Delhi will be reluctant to support funding for its historic adversary.
Granted, BRICS was never intended to resolve every disagreement among its members. Yet the grouping has also let slip several chances to truly deepen cooperation among its members, independent of Western-created structures.
For instance, the bloc created the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to supply currency swaps during foreign-exchange crises. Yet the CRA also requires members to accept IMF conditions to access more than 30% of their allocations. Paradoxically, this led South Africa to choose the better-resourced and more adaptable IMF over the CRA when it sought a controversial $4.3 billion loan in 2020.
In principle, BRICS’s flexibility should be a strength, enabling it to welcome members from across the geopolitical divide. But without mechanisms to coordinate governments, enforce rules, and penalize non-compliance, the bloc is essentially powerless.
Without a clear mandate or binding protocols, these “growing pains” could escalate into more serious problems.
Optimists might hope that new members—such as Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most-populous nation and a rising manufacturing and energy hub—could mediate between rival powers. But how eager will they be to unravel disputes and strategic competitions that have festered for decades?
Compounding this, many current and prospective BRICS members—like Indonesia, India, and the UAE—are continuously seeking U.S. investment and strengthening security ties. Brazil, which has clashed with Washington since Trump began his second term, faces a White House determined to expand its strategic footprint and leverage in Latin America, making Brasília cautious about fully committing to any single bloc.
Moreover, some members grapple with domestic turmoil. If Iran, under heavy U.S. pressure and amid ongoing mass protests, descends into further instability, it would undoubtedly disrupt the flow of oil to India and China through the Strait of Hormuz, illustrating how one nation’s crisis can rapidly impact the entire group.
If BRICS is to be more than merely an acronym, its members must view themselves as collaborators in a shared venture. This will require developing and embracing mutually accepted ground rules with enforcement mechanisms. Otherwise, unchecked expansion could prove to be BRICS’s downfall.
The views expressed in commentary articles are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of .