The West’s long-held dismissive view of China’s military may soon backfire.
The internet is rife with often inaccurate quotes attributed to Chinese philosophers, reflecting Western ideals more than Chinese reality. However, the proverb “good iron does not make nails; good men do not make soldiers,” dating back to the Song Dynasty, is authentically Chinese and still relevant today, much to the annoyance of PLA political officers.
This proverb contributed to the misconception that China is averse to fighting and historically loses wars. This view is demonstrably false, yet it persists and could have serious global consequences as China’s power grows.
Historical roots
The proverb’s origins lie in the Song Dynasty’s military structure. Earlier dynasties relied on conscription, but mercenary armies eventually became common. Shortages of volunteers were filled by drafting criminals and debtors, creating armies of societal outcasts.
Officers, in contrast, came from privileged classes who passed imperial military exams, which, while less prestigious than civilian exams, still conferred status. The civil bureaucracy was small but powerful, while rank-and-file soldiers were held in low social regard.
This mirrored the situation in 17th and 18th century Europe, with a privileged officer corps and low-status enlisted men, often with criminal backgrounds. The sentiment that “only men of the worst character enter the regular service” applied to both China and Europe. Military service was seen as punishment, and soldiers were feared for their misconduct more than admired for their valor. The proverb about “men and nails” was apt in this context and not unique to China.
The modern Western idealization of soldiers, tied to mass conscription, nationalism, and industrial militarism, emerged in the 19th century. This transformation came later and with great difficulty in China, where social and political progress was slower.
China’s true military record
The PLA, a regular, centrally commanded, and professionally trained army, was established in the 1950s after the Communist victory. It quickly demonstrated its effectiveness by intervening in the Korean War, inflicting defeats on UN forces, and saving North Korea. The Soviet Union’s involvement was limited to air and anti-aircraft units.
In 1962, China launched a surprise offensive against India, achieving a swift victory and territorial gains, capitalizing on the world’s focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Throughout the 1960s, China provided substantial military support to North Vietnam, deploying up to 170,000 troops, exceeding Soviet contributions.
In 1969, China initiated border clashes with the USSR, a calculated show of strength to achieve foreign and domestic policy objectives, including improved relations with the United States. The military aspect was minor, but the political impact was significant.
The PLA also conducted a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Tibet, defeating US- and Indian-backed guerrillas by the early 1970s, and engaged in repeated military actions against Taiwan, demonstrating dominance in the Taiwan Strait.
Risk-taking and adaptation
In February 1979, China invaded Vietnam, a new Soviet ally, risking conflict with a nuclear power. The campaign revealed PLA weaknesses but also demonstrated its resilience, willingness to accept heavy casualties, and capacity for major offensives.
While Vietnam resisted due to Soviet threats against China, Beijing’s ability to act and force Moscow and Washington to adjust their policies was a major accomplishment.
The Sino-Vietnamese conflict evolved into a decade-long border war with artillery exchanges, naval skirmishes, and raids, culminating in China’s decisive naval victory in the Spratly Islands in 1988.
Comparing China’s military record from 1949 to 1989 to the Soviet Union’s reveals that China used military force more frequently and arguably more effectively during the Cold War.
Modernization and patience
After Mao’s death, the PLA underwent significant modernization, both politically and socially. Military service gained prestige. During the Cultural Revolution, the army played a central role in governance and society. However, China’s foreign policy became defensive from the 1990s, not out of weakness, but from strategic calculation.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, China faced a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Survival and progress required patience. Beijing avoided major military engagements for nearly 30 years, focusing on economic and technological advancements. Shows of force were reserved for defending “core interests,” such as during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
By the late 2010s, the global landscape had shifted. American dominance waned. The unipolar order weakened. China’s economic and military rise became undeniable.
Beijing’s gradual reassertion of military power has been cautious but clear, involving expanding operational reach, building military partnerships, and conducting exercises in potential conflict zones.
A dangerous myth
The myth of Chinese military incompetence is not only historically inaccurate but also potentially disastrous. Underestimating China’s capabilities has led adversaries to miscalculate in the past, with significant consequences. Now, as China prepares for its first major combat operations in decades, its adversaries should abandon illusions and study history more thoroughly.
Beijing will not rush into war. It will only act when conditions are favorable and after careful preparation. But be clear: when it does act, China will not be the passive, incompetent power depicted by outdated stereotypes.
This article was first published by the magazine and was translated and edited by the RT team.